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The control and monitoring of the distribution network is going to go through
some profound changes in the future, while the amount of distributed energy pro-
duction, automation and controllable resources increase in the network. In such sit-
uation the assumption of unidirectional ﬂow of energy from the production through
transmission network and distribution network to customers might not be valid any
more. Distributed energy resources, such as wind turbines and photovoltaic plants
are often located near the consumption and connected to the distribution network
instead of transmission network. With the use of novel network management tools
and coordinated voltage control an acceptable state of the network can be main-
tained and the whole potential of the system utilized.
This thesis presents a new distribution automation concept developed in IDE4L
project as well as the construction of the test environment and test results. The
automation system of the IDE4L project is based on a decentralized, modular and
hierarchical approach that aims to reduce the rigidity of a traditional control center
based system while providing a large variety of features for network monitoring and
control. The main parts of this system are substation automation units (SAU),
that spread out the decision making and control of the network. Each SAU acts
as an individual control unit that controls and monitors devices in that part of the
network and delivers only necessary data to the higher level control center. The aim
of this thesis is to investigate and list especially non-functional requirements to be
tested on a decentralized automation system.
The main focus of testing is at the operation of the automation architecture and
its non-functional requirements. The testing is conducted at the Real time digital
simulator laboratory with actual intelligent electronic devices (IED) and SAU. Re-
liability and availability for the whole system and its components is studied with
a theoretical approach. All other tests, such as failure and error handling, time
performance and resource utilisation, are carried out with the laboratory set up.
Testing did not bring up any major issues or constraints that would occur when the
system size is scaled up, but some observations were made about the test set up as
well as commissioning and interoperability of IEDs that should be considered.
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Jakeluverkkojen monitorointi ja hallinta tulevat käymään läpi merkittäviä muu-
toksia tulevien vuosien ja vuosikymmenten aikana, kun lisääntyvä hajautetun tuotan-
non, jakeluatomaation ja ohjattavien resurssien määrä verkossa kasvaa. Hajautetut
energiaresurssit, kuten aurinkopaneelit ja tuulivoimalat, ovat usein sijoitettu jakelu-
verkkoon melko lähelle kulutusta, eikä perinteinen oletus tehon yksisuuntaisesta vir-
tauksesta korkeammalta jännitetasolta alemmalle välttämättä pidä enää paikkaansa.
Hyödyntämällä uudenlaisia verkonhallintatyökaluja sekä koordinoitua jännnitteen-
säätöä pystytään nykyisen verkon tila pitämään sallituissa rajoissa ja maksimoimaan
verkkoon liitettävän hajautetun tuotannon määrä.
Tässä diplomityössä esitellään uudentyyppinen hajautettuun arkkitehtuuriin pe-
rustuva sähkönjakeluautomaatiojärjestelmä, joka on kehitetty osana IDE4L-projektia.
Lisäksi laboratoriotestijärjestelmän rakentaminen ja kokoonpano sekä järjestelmällä
saadut tulokset on esitelty. IDE4L-projektissa kehitetty järjestelmä pyrkii hajaut-
tamaan päätöksentekoa muuntamoille ja sähköasemille sijoitetuille muuntamoau-
tomaatioyksiköille (SAU) ja tätä kautta tekemään järjestelmästä entistä joustavam-
mman. Jokainen SAU toimii verkossa itsenäisenä valvonta- ja ohjausyksikkönä, joka
monitoroi siihen kytketyviä laitteita niin muuntamolla kuin verkon varrella ja pystyy
myös antamaan tarvittaessa näille laitteille uusia asetusarvoja. Tämä diplomityön
tavoitteena on lisäksi selvittää hajautetulle automaatiojärjestelmälle kriittiset ei-
toiminnalliset ominaisuudet ja miten niitä pystyttäisiin testaamaan.
Työssä suoritettujen testien pääpaino on automaatiojärjestelmän yleisen suori-
tuskyvyn sekä työssä määriteltyjen ei-toiminnallisten ominaisuuksien sevittäminen
laboratoriojärjestelmän avulla. Testit suoritetaan reaaliaikasimulaattorilaborato-
riossa (RTDS), jossa simulointiin on kytketty myös fyysisiä laitteita sekä SAU. Lu-
otettavuuden ja käyttövarmuuden analysointi on toteutettu laskennallisesti, kun taas
muut testit, liittyen esimerkiksi häiriöiden ja virheiden sietokykyyn, mittaustarkku-
uteen sekä resurssien käyttöön suoritetaan laboratoriojärjestelmän avulla. Testit
eivät paljastaneet järjestelmästä mitään selviä ongelmakohtia tai rajoitteita vaikka
järjestelmän koko kasvaisi, mutta joitain huomion arvoisia seikkoja ilmeni liittyen
testijärjestelmään sekä laitteiden yhteensopivuuteen ja käyttöönottoon.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Electricity distribution and production is going through a profound change during
next years or decades, while the production is no longer centralized to large power
plants connected to the high voltage transmission grid, but more and more produc-
tion is coming from smaller decentralized energy resources (DER) located closer to
consumption in the distribution network. This causes a situation where the power
ﬂow in the network is not necessarily unidirectional from higher voltage levels to
lower ones, as it has been in the traditional network. It is also not valid any more to
assume that the maximum voltage of the network can be found at the substation,
since even small production units along the feeder can result to higher network volt-
ages near the DER unit. For a distribution network operator to be able to maintain
adequate state in the network there are few diﬀerent options, that can be divided
into measures which include upgrades and changes in the network and to measures
that improve the control and monitoring of the network. [1]
The DER hosting capacity of a distribution network can be improved by increas-
ing the feeder size resulting to lower feeder impedance, connecting the DER units to
speciﬁc feeders or to lower the voltage at the substation. The substation voltage can
be decreased permanently only if it is guaranteed that the network state remains
adequate also with the lower voltage level. Another way is to change the operating
principle of the network by adding coordinated voltage control (CVC) methods to the
network based on rule based or optimized control. [1] A novel control architecture of
a distribution network is developed in the IDE4L project and includes decentralized
distribution automation and coordinated voltage control methods. The automation
concept is based on decentralized, hierarchical and modular design where the control
of the network is distributed to substation automation units (SAU) located at both
primary and secondary substations. The primary control of the network is executed
by local control devices, such as automatic voltage control relays and automatic
voltage regulators. Each individual SAU is controlling and monitoring the feeders
leaving the substation and all the intelligent electronic devices (IED) located along
them. In the case when local control devices are not able to maintain appropriate
network state or the network state is too far from the optimum the CVC algorithm
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is able to provide new operating set points for the control devices. SAU also aggre-
gates the measurements from the IEDs and transmits just the necessary data to the
higher level control center.[2]
The objective of this thesis is to ﬁnd out and list important non-functional re-
quirements for a decentralized automation system along with possible suggestions
and procedures to test them. A novel architecture for a decentralized distribution
automation system developed in the IDE4L project is also presented. The build-
ing of the laboratory demonstration set up to real time digital simulator (RTDS)
laboratory for the testing purposes of the automation system is also included to
this thesis and devices and interfaces included to that are presented in chapter 4.
The automation system concept and architecture is introduced in chapter 3 along
with general introduction to non-functional requirements (NFR). Tests to deﬁne the
performance and NFRs for the automation system are explained in the chapter 5
and results presented.
32. DISTRIBUTION NETWORK VOLTAGE
CONTROL
In traditional distribution network the voltage control is mainly executed in the
primary substation and the rest of the network is considered as passive network
with unidirectional power ﬂow towards the customers. Based on the assumption
made about the unidirectional power ﬂow the voltage proﬁle of a radial distribution
network feeder with only load can be seen in ﬁgure 2.1.
Figure 2.1 Voltage proﬁle of a traditional radial network feeder with only load. Adapted
from [3, p. 12]
Due to the fact that all the generation is located in the high voltage network the
distribution networks highest voltage can be found from either of the substations
and the voltage level will decline towards the end of the feeder. In ﬁgure 2.1 there
are two diﬀerent lines representing diﬀerent loading conditions of the network. The
blue line shows the voltage proﬁle in the situation where the load is at it's minimum,
which leads to highest voltage proﬁle, and the red line shows the situation when the
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load is at it's maximum and the voltage drop along the feeder is at it's maximum
too.
Traditionally the automatic voltage control of the distribution network has been
located at the HV/MV substation where the voltage level of the MV network has
been controlled with automatic tap changer. By raising the tap position at the
primary substation the voltage level will rise in MV as well as in LV network fed
by that transformer. The tap changer is controlled by a voltage control relay, that
constantly monitors the secondary voltage of the transformer. Once the voltage
drops below or rises above predeﬁned levels of the relay a control signal is sent to
the tap changer to alter it's position to restore the voltage at permissible level. [4]
Installation of distributed generation or other DERs to the distribution network
is however causing problems for the traditional control system and can result in high
costs to the network. Installation of distributed generation can cause voltage rise
near the connection point of the generator, which limits the maximum DER hosting
capacity of the network. [1] In the ﬁgure 2.1 the voltage rise margin in the minimum
load situation basically deﬁnes the limit for the amount of distributed generation
(DG) to be integrated in that LV network without performing any other changes to
the network. If more DG are connected there is a possibility that in some situations
the voltage at the last customer is too high. [3] There are several ways to solve
the voltage rise situation: decreasing feeder impedance, changing the substation
voltage, changing voltage at some other point of the feeder or control of real and
reactive power ﬂow in the network. Currently the issue is often solved by increasing
the conductor size of the feeder, which results in decreased feeder impedance, or
by having a speciﬁc feeder for the generator where higher voltage can be allowed.
In this case the operating principle of the network stays intact, but there could be
signiﬁcant costs because of the change in network infrastructure and also because
components may have been replaced prior to the end of their useful life. [1]
Methods to provide CVC to the distribution network vary a lot from simple
control rule based system to system utilizing advanced optimization algorithms to
control the whole network. These are the two extremities of CVC methods. Con-
trol rule based methods ﬁt better for controlling the voltage in simple, often radial,
networks where only few diﬀerent control options exist. One of the simplest cases is
CVC by controlling on load tap changers ﬁtted in the substations power transform-
ers, since the change of voltage level on the substation aﬀects the voltage level of the
whole distribution network. In this case the tap changer is controlled based on the
state of the whole network rather than just local measurements from the substation
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as it is done traditionally. To the simple control rule based CVC it is also possible
to add local voltage and reactive power control, such as generator automatic voltage
regulators (AVR). These local control devices act normally a lot faster than the
control at the substation and they are often enough to restore the voltage at its
appropriate level. [1]
63. DECENTRALIZED AUTOMATION SYSTEM
The power distribution grid has typically consisted of high voltage to medium voltage
transformation at primary substation (PS), medium voltage to low voltage trans-
formation at secondary substation (SS) and ﬁnally customers connected to the grid
mainly at low voltage level. The control and management of the grid has been
executed by centralized control system where devices at PS are been monitored
by control center (CC) and then controlled remotely with supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) and distribution management (DMS) systems. The DMS
contains detailed network data and advanced DMS versions include also smart func-
tionalities such as coordinated voltage control and low voltage network data on top
of the information from PS equipment. [5]
This thesis was made as a part of the IDE4L project and the laboratory test set
up presented was build to test the automation concept before ﬁeld testing. The goal
for the IDE4L project is to develop an active network management (ANM) system
with signiﬁcant amount of integrated distributed energy resources (DER) in the
network and pinpoint issues and special features to take into account. One essential
part of the ANM is distribution automation and how it will be integrated to power
system management and other parties in electricity market. The utilisation of DERs
to act as parts of the network management, instead of just being installed and left
there to produce electricity, plays also a key role in this project.
Distribution automation makes it possible to control the medium and low volt-
age network as well as DERs and it includes automation on both primary and sec-
ondary substations, control center information systems and automation in customer
premises, such as smart meters or charging stations for electric vehicles. Whereas
the real-time monitoring of the network used to be located only at primary substa-
tion, it should now be expanded to secondary substation, low voltage network and
to advanced smart meter monitoring at customer end in order to make ANM work
properly. To make the active management of the whole network feasible the design
work needs to be executed consistently. The system needs to be at the same time
well coordinated to be able to control diﬀerent parts of the network and to integrate
technical and commercial decisions, but also to be distributed to use local param-
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eters available to make real-time control decisions. In order to enable such system
primary and secondary substations as well as DERs need to be equipped with con-
trol devices, such as substation automation units (SAU) and intelligent electronic
devices (IED), to distribute the decision making and control to local sites. [2]
3.1 Decentralized distribution automation system of IDE4L
The automation architecture of IDE4L project is based on a hierarchical decentral-
ized system, which smoothly integrates coordinated control of the network to IT
systems. At the lowest level of the hierarchical architecture are IEDs, located at
all voltage levels of the grid. There are IEDs controlling local resources, such as
photovoltaic (PV) plants, as well as IEDs that are located at the secondary and
primary substation and medium voltage network. They are further connected to
substation automation units at the primary and secondary substation, which moni-
tor and control all IEDs that are connected to them. The SAU at both substations
is acting as the main intelligent unit of each speciﬁc monitoring and controlling area
of the network. The distribution management system (DMS) works as a centralized
and distribution network wide control and monitoring unit that provides the DSO
an interface with a market operator and along with the commercial aggregator. The
decentralization of automation enables also use of increased number of measure-
ment sensors, for example from smart meters, to be used for network monitoring
and control, which would be more diﬃcult to establish with centralized system due
to extensive amount of data to be transferred. [2]
In addition to the other important requirements and features presented in this
chapter reliability is a crucial feature for distribution automation system and in
general it can be described as follows: Reliability is the probability of a device per-
forming its purpose adequately for the period of time intended under the operating
conditions encountered. [6] There are always some main indices when deﬁning the
reliability of a system, although they are not necessarily the same for each case
and should be chosen to suit the system in hand. There are, however, four indices
that are generally termed as reliability indices and on the other hand reliability is
often referred as a combination of all these four. These indices are all included in
the general deﬁnition of reliability: probability, appropriate performance, time and
operating conditions. Some good examples of additional indices for reliability are:
- the average time between failures,
- The average outage duration or device down-time caused by a failure,
- the expected loss in turnover due to a failure.
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The suitable index or indices can be determined by using probability theory,
but still there is no single formula that would work in every system. Appropriate
performance, time and operating conditions are all engineering parameters, which
depend solely on the system under study. [7, p. 2-3]
Time is also a critical part of the measurement data and the IDE4L automa-
tion and network management concept beneﬁts from the large amount of real-time
measurements received from various ﬁeld devices. The measurement reading cycle
for devices varies from few seconds to minutes, depending on the device type and
importance of the measurements in question to ensure that algorithms at SAU have
all the latest measurements and they are updated when the network state changes.
The presumption and goal that adequate amount of real-time measurements are
available for functions at SAU is directly linked to the reliability of the system and
along to the availability of the system. The availability is a measure to represent
the time the system is operable and all the devices and interfaces are functional. An
availability of 100 % would mean that there are no gaps in the operation of the sys-
tem within the deﬁned time period. This does not necessarily mean that there could
not be any failures, but it could be because the system is constructed in redundant
way that a failure of one or perhaps several parts of the system is not causing the
whole system to fail. [8] Reliability and availability as well as time characteristics
and scalability of the system are further discussed in chapter 5
3.1.1 SAU
One of the main units in the whole distribution automation system in IDE4L project
are the substation automation units. SAUs are located at both primary and sec-
ondary substations where they act as a monitoring and control unit for IEDs in the
ﬁeld, but also as a communication interface between ﬁeld devices and higher level
units, such as SCADA or DMS. [2]
SAU collects measurements and status information of devices located on the same
substation or along feeders leaving the station, but it also takes care of network
control and state estimation and state forecast. SAU includes multiple interfaces
with diﬀerent protocols for communicating with various types of devices:
- IEC 61850 manufacturing message speciﬁcation (MMS), for network control
- Device language message speciﬁcation/companion speciﬁcation for energy me-
tering (DLMS/COSEM) for smart meter communication
- IEC 60870-5-104, although in demonstrations this interface is realized by spe-
ciﬁc device, which does the mapping between IEC 104 and IEC 61850 MMS
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protocols
- Web services, which provide meter data concentrator device or advanced meter
management interface for SAU to receive smart meter data
- IEC 61850-90-5/C37.118 for exchanging information with phasor measurement
Units (PMU)
- Modbus TCP [2]
The ﬁgure 3.1 represents the internal data structure of the SAU. Both primary
and secondary SAUs are based on the same fundamental model and only the part
of the network and IEDs under control are diﬀerent.
Figure 3.1 The internal data structure of substation automation units concept. [2, p.49]
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A major part of the SAU, which eventually enables most of the functions listed in
ﬁgure 3.1 to operate, is the database. Most of the data, such as measurements and
state information, gathered from IEDs in the network are stored in the relational
database management system as well as all the results from diﬀerent algorithms,
but time-series database is also implemented to support data received from PMUs.
[2]
3.1.2 IED
An intelligent electronic device (IED) is the actuating part of the distribution au-
tomation system and especially important in decentralized system. IEDs spread
the decision making and network control actions to broader area and away from the
control center and closer to local sites, such as end customers and distributed energy
sources. IED itself is quite inexact deﬁnition of devices that include intelligence to
act autonomously, controlling and monitoring their part of the network or device
connected to the network. Some devices numbered among the group of IEDs are
Remote terminal units (RTU), smart meters, home energy management systems and
primary controllers like voltage control relays. As the deﬁnition is a bit vague in
this project a more speciﬁc classiﬁcation of IEDs is being used, which can be seen in
ﬁgure 3.2. The ﬁrst separation is done by the location of the IED in the network:
PSIED is located in the primary substation, SSIED in the secondary substation,
DIED somewhere outside any substation and ﬁnally end customers Home Energy
Management System (HEMS). [2]
The actual device types, allocated by their locations, can be seen in the right
side of the ﬁgure 3.2, where for example both substations include an automatic
voltage controller (AVC) for controlling the on load tap changer of each substation.
The HEMS on the other hand acts as the interface towards commercial aggregator
and also for user to manage possible DERs at ones premises. IEDs can also contain
several types of interfaces, which are mainly mapped into IEC 61850 protocol with
gateways or used as such, for example smart meter interfaces DLMS/COSEM which
can be directly connected to the corresponding interface at SAU. [2, p.50]
3.1.3 Functions for use case
The substation automation unit includes several functions and algorithms that are
vital in order to achieve proper network monitoring and control. For the secondary
voltage control use case there are three main functions related to it: network state
estimation, load and production forecaster and power control functions. The power
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Figure 3.2 The internal data structure of intelligent electronic device and the classiﬁca-
tion to diﬀerent device types. [2, p.50]
control algorithm enables the actual voltage control in real time, but it can not
operate without the input data coming from the state estimator algorithm. The
input data from load and production forecaster to state estimator on the other hand
enables more precise state estimates to be calculated.
State estimation
Distribution network state estimation is being used to create as good estimate as
possible of the current network state by utilizing all available measurements and
other data. In current networks the state estimation is based on measurements from
substation, line information and customer load proﬁles. The power ﬂow and loading
conditions of each feeder leaving the substation can be calculated precisely from the
substation measurements including the busbar voltage measurement and power or
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current ﬂow measurements from each feeder. Although with these measurements it
is not possible to accurately deﬁne how the loading distributes within each feeder.[9]
The increase of distributed energy resources and automation in distribution network
makes it impossible to achieve realistic state estimation for the network with this
type of system. In such network a real-time state estimation algorithm is needed and
that requires additional real-time measurements from the network. [10] Increased
automation and distributed resources also mean more active network management
with for example automatic power and voltage control, which also requires real-time
state estimations to be able to properly control the network. [9]
There are several versions of state estimation algorithms developed in the past
and most of them use weighted least squares method for the calculations, but the
choice of so called state variables have variation. State variables are variables in the
network which are used as the basis for the state estimation calculation and they
are mostly either node voltages and their phase angels or branch currents and their
phase angles. In IDE4L project the main concern when selecting the state estimation
concept is that it has to be suitable for medium and low voltage networks and has
to have a proven record of it functioning since it will be used eventually in several
ﬁeld demonstrations included in the project. Both node voltage and branch current
methods fulﬁl these requirements and both have their own strengths, but the branch
current method was chosen based on the fact that people working on this project
have more experience on that beforehand. [11]
Load and production forecaster
The load and production forecaster consist of two separate functions: load forecaster
and production forecaster. The load forecaster can be divided into diﬀerent cate-
gories depending on the time frame of the forecast and in this case the interest is on
the short-term load forecasting, which includes day-ahead forecasting. Longer-term
load forecasts can be utilized to address decisions regarding for example future in-
vestment decisions, but the long-term forecasting in IDE4L project is being used for
example for next day's trade. The method a forecaster operates can be based on a
statistical approach or Artiﬁcial Intelligence-based approach (AI).
The statistical model forecast the future load based on historical data and cur-
rent data about for example weather and date as the AI-based model can handle
complexity and is more ﬂexible, but requires more data to be dependable. The
production forecast on the other hand forecasts wind and photovoltaic energy with
either physical models, statistical models or with AI-based models. Physical models
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try to forecast, for example for wind power plant, the wind reaching each of the
turbines and from that how much they will produce energy. Basically the model is
based on DERs location and to its technical and physical properties. When histori-
cal data of the energy production combined with meteorological forecasts are added
to the system the model becomes statistical model and will be able to provide more
accurate forecasts, especially in short-term time frame. There are multiple meth-
ods, such as Fuzzy logic, genetic algorithms or neural networks, to execute AI-based
forecasting. Although all the forecasting methods are fairly light to run once the
system is completely operational, AI-based methods are very data intensive in the
beginning when it has to be taught to operate in that particular system while phys-
ical and statistical models can start operating with less initial data. The forecasting
of load and production in IDE4L project is essentially based on statistical models,
which are proven to work reliably and be robust. Forecasting algorithm is equipped
with historical measurements and weather forecasts from a local weather station.
[11]
Power control
The real time power control algorithm (PC) is the key function for the secondary
voltage control and it is based on optimization. The algorithm uses for example
the information about network losses and constrained real power of the DG units to
formulate the objective function for the network optimization. [12, p. 43], [1, p. 35]
The ﬁgure 3.3 presents the ﬂowchart of the diﬀerent steps for the power control
algorithm.
The operation of power control algorithm includes nine diﬀerent steps in a loop,
as can be seen in the ﬁgure 3.3. The algorithm operates in an one minute loop,
although possible to specify otherwise too, once it has been started and it has
read all the static network data from the database. When the beginning of a new
minute has been reached the algorithm checks if all the other algorithms needed
for the PC have been executed and if all the necessary input data for the PC is
available after which it moves to the next stage. If some of the input data is missing
the algorithm moves to exceptional situation handling state 1 and does not ﬁnish
the whole loop. In the situation where all the input data is available algorithm
reads that from the database along with updated static network data if necessary.
After the input data has been read and processed the optimization algorithm is
called. It initialises the optimization problem on hand, runs a sequential quadratic
programming (SQP) algorithm and with heuristic method assigns discrete variables.
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Figure 3.3 Flowchart showing the real time power control algorithms operation princi-
ple. [12, p. 44]
In case a suitable solution has been found for the problem the algorithm inspects
if setpoints of the control devices need to be changed. The algorithm calculates
objective functions with current setpoint and with new setpoints deﬁned by the
optimization and current setpoints will not be changed if the decrease of the objective
function is not big enough to exceed a set limit. If the network state has been for
some reason unacceptable before the optimization the setpoints will be changed to
restore an admissible state. When the algorithm can not ﬁnd a suitable solution it
enters the exceptional situation handling state 2. Last step for the algorithm is to
write all the output data to the database where diﬀerent interfaces of the SAU will
execute the actual transfer of the new setpoints to control devices. [12]
3.2. Hierarchy 15
3.2 Hierarchy
The complete distribution automation system in IDE4L is based on a hierarchical
architecture. Main reason to have a decentralized hierarchical architecture is on
the other hand to divide and spread out the intelligence and decision making of
the network control but also provide a clear connection point for external parties to
network control through the control center. The control center monitors the state
of the whole network, thus providing useful information for external parties that
are more interested on the overall state of the grid. External parties on this case
cover commercial aggregators, transmission network owner and electricity market
parties. The actual network monitoring and control operates in co-operation with
the tertiary control located at DMS by employing the decentralized decision making
of IEDs and monitoring and possible control actions executed by SAUs. [2, p. 11]
The traditional way of controlling the distribution network is with a centralized
control architecture, which is based on supervisory and data acquisition system
(SCADA). At the bottom layer of the control architecture are primary devices that
are directly interfaced with consumers, such as metering devices, generators or tap
changers, and are able to perform some control actions locally. Primary devices are
then interfaced with IEDs, which are on the secondary device layer and perform
operation mode and setpoint changes of the primary devices and also interface them
to the communication network. The IEDs are then all connected to the control
center and this ensemble of IEDs, communication network and control center form
the SCADA system. This control architecture can be seen in Figure 3.4
The traditional distribution network control often includes primary substation
control, possible control of devices along mid voltage feeders and some IEDs at the
secondary substation, but the state of low voltage network is mainly established by
controlling the feeding mid voltage network state. Distribution network operators
often control their network with a single SCADA system, which may face several
issues when the amount of automation and distributed energy resources is increased
and also expanded to the low voltage network. The increased automation and result-
ing increase of transported data in the communication network between secondary
devices and control center may cause congestion and increased delays. In this case
the accuracy and operating rate of control actions can be impaired. [13, p. 9-11] The
proposed control architecture in IDE4l project can be seen in Figure 3.5. In the
IDE4L project local control devices are referred as primary control devices and the
secondary control is located at the SAU and it is capable of changing the operating
setpoints of the primary devices. On top of that the tertiary control of the network
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Figure 3.4 Hierarchical architecture and data transfer amounts of a centralized network
control system.
is located at the control center level.
The diﬀerence of the hierarchical control center-primary substation-secondary
substation control architecture on IDE4L project and of a legacy control system is
the division of control actions, as represented in Figure 3.5. In this case the sec-
ondary network control actually operates on both primary and secondary substation
and primary control at IEDs and DERs. The IDE4L system includes also diﬀerent
operational time scales, while the primary control works in real-time and possible
control functions on substations in intra-hour scale, the tertiary control located at
higher levels operates in day-ahead scale and determines the conﬁguration limits
for the secondary control. The aim in this hierarchical system has been to reduce
the rigidity of a classical hierarchical system by dividing the control and decision
making to separate intelligent modules, which both lead to partially autonomous
control operations. By spreading the control from a centralized control center to
distributed units, namely substation automation units, the data transfer is also re-
duced between control center and lower level devices. The connector line thickness
in Figures 3.4 and 3.5 illustrates the scale of data transferred between hierarchical
levels and as can be seen the main diﬀerence between these systems is the amount
of data transferred between control center and SAUs. This increases the operation
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Figure 3.5 Hierarchical architecture and data transfer amounts of the network control
system proposed in IDE4L project.
rate of automation in the network as well as overall hosting capacity of the network
regarding automation and control devices, because all the data from IEDs is gath-
ered to the SAU and only vital data will be forwarded to the control center. [2,
p. 13-14]
3.3 Modularity
The centralized control architecture based on a SCADA system represents the state
of the art network control system and can be designed to execute active network
management and diverse smart grid related control actions. They are however re-
alized by often custom developed and large software ensembles which makes them
challenging to be used in other applications. This severely impairs the ﬂexibility
of the system, which is becoming more and more important feature of a network
control system along with more complicated and advanced automation implemen-
tations. [14]
In the automation system of IDE4L a modular design has been used, which makes
the system a lot more ﬂexible. Modularity makes it possible to use full versions of
speciﬁc features of the system only where they are truly needed and also leave
out completely some features from certain points of the network where they would
3.4. Scalability 18
not be needed. Modular design also enables re-usability of monitoring and control
architecture, since all the same implementations and features can be used when the
basic architecture is the same. [2]
Modularity is in theory made possible by using same data structure of objects
on diﬀerent levels, such as the same internal construction of the SAU on both sub-
stations. In practice, use of IEDs that support or can be made to support common
communication and automation protocols ultimately enables the modularity of the
system. On top of that well deﬁned and interoperable interfaces between devices,
such as use of IEC 61850 as the main protocol for distribution automation and vari-
ous interfaces of the SAU, make sure all parts of the system work ﬂawlessly together.
The whole automation system consists of modular and as much as possible indepen-
dently working sets of functions and data that are both functionally and in some
cases spatially divided, such as low voltage state estimation conducted at secondary
substation and medium voltage state estimation at primary substation. [2]
3.4 Scalability
Distribution of automation and modular design of a system makes it possible to
realise an easily scalable automation system. Scalability is especially important for
distribution automation system, where there are a large number of network nodes,
substations, end customers and distributed energy resources. The system needs to
be able to adapt for changing, mainly growing, network size and connection points.
It is expected, that a monitoring system that suits this kind of automation system
architecture will be available with a capability to cover millions of measurement and
data points within the next decade.
Modularity in automation in principal enables the adaptation of the network au-
tomation to network changes just by adding or removing some predeﬁned modular
automation system objects from the system model, for example IEDs. The distri-
bution of intelligence to substation automation units and ﬁeld devices reduces the
need and amount of information to be transferred up to the control center level. In
this case all the necessary data, such as measurements, are in real-time available
for controlling IEDs and nearly as fast for SAUs, which can then further control
IEDs if necessary. SAUs then pack and send necessary data to control center, thus
reducing the communication traﬃc signiﬁcantly between substations and control
center. When the communication link to control center is no more a bottleneck of
the communication system, the modular system can expand more easily. The next
possible problematic could be the computing capacity of the SAU, but with today's
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powerful computers and fast Ethernet based communication it is unlikely to be an
issue. [2, p. 9,10]
3.5 Non-functional requirements
Requirements for a system can be roughly divided into functional requirements
(FR) and to non-functional requirements (NFR). All the features that describe what
the system, for example software or automation system, should actually do are
functional requirements. Non-functional requirements on the other hand are things
that constrain the system, while they include for example quality and performance
requirements. NFR are diﬃcult to specify in comparison to FR, although they are
equally important.
In software and information technology non-functional requirements are speciﬁed
and standardized in ISO 25010. The standard divides NFRs in to eight diﬀerent
categories, which are: functional suitability, reliability, performance eﬃciency, us-
ability, security, compatibility, maintainability and portability [15]. The NFRs are
brieﬂy described as follows,
- Functional suitability : how well the system provides stated functions under
deﬁned conditions
- Reliability : how well the system provides stated functions under deﬁned con-
ditions for a speciﬁed time period
- Performance eﬃciency : performance in relation to the amount of system re-
sources used
- Usability : how well the system can be used by speciﬁed users to fulﬁl deﬁned
goals eﬀectively, eﬃciently and satisfactorily
- Security : how well the system or product protects data and information by
controlling the access of other persons or products based on their level of
authorization
- Compatibility : how the system, product or a component interacts and ex-
changes information with other systems and performs its dedicated functions,
while sharing the same hardware or software platform
- Maintainability : how eﬀective and eﬃcient it is to modify the system or a
product by deﬁned maintainers
- Portability : how eﬀectively and eﬃciently a system, product or a component
can be moved from one operational environment to another. [15]
Of course not all of the NFRs can be equally well met in every system and that
is why it has to be decided which ones are most important for the system and then
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prioritize those. For example applications with graphical user interface usability is
in key role and for safety-critical applications the system needs to be reliable and
secure. [16]
In automation technology there is no standardized list of NFRs and especially
for distributed systems it can be especially challenging to deﬁne which requirements
should be prioritized. Some main requirements for distributed automation systems
can still be listed, which would be above all reliability, maintainability, performance
eﬃciency, portability and compatibility. All of those requirements have to be con-
sidered thoroughly when designing a distributed system. Other highly important
NFRs are:
- Analysability : the grade to which a failure can be located and traced back in
the system
- Testability : the level of eﬀort needed for testing of the system including all
preparation, testing and documentation
- Time behaviour : processing and response times within the system when per-
forming its dedicated function in relation to a known benchmark
- Resource utilisation: the amounts and sorts of resources in use when the system
performs its function in relation to a known benchmark.
Analysability and testability are important in any system, but NFRs such as time
behaviour and resource utilisation create new challenges in distributed systems. As
the amount of devices, such as programmable logic controllers (PLC), in the system
increases response times can get signiﬁcantly longer and cause problems for the
execution of the process if not taken into consideration. The increased amount
of devices can cause the system to run out of resources for all the devices too,
which would require resource access control that further impairs the eﬃciency of the
process. [16]
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4. LABORATORY AND TEST
ARRANGEMENT
The laboratory equipment and devices integrated to the demonstration set-up in-
clude several diﬀerent IEDs, which are meant to act as parts of the coordinated
voltage control scheme alongside the RTDS network simulation model and sub-
station automation units. The complete test arrangement includes protection and
control IEDs, remote terminal unit, smart meters and various communication and
automation components.
4.1 Demonstration system
The laboratory demonstration is a part of the IDE4L project and the goal is to
demonstrate and test distribution automation and network control system developed
in this project with an example of coordinated voltage control in a network with
distributed electricity generation. With experience gathered from the laboratory
demonstration the concept will be tested in actual network ﬁeld demonstrations.
The communication interface is based mainly on IEC 61850 protocol. The system
with all of the integrated devices related to coordinated voltage control and their
communication interfaces can be seen in ﬁgure 4.1, along with the basic contents
of the SAU.
In this laboratory environment both primary and secondary SAUs are imple-
mented in the same SAU PC running a Linux Ubuntu operating system. The main
part of the SAU is the database containing the whole network topology and where
all measurement and state information gathered from ﬁeld devices will be stored.
Functions included in to both SAUs, such as state estimation and real time power
control, get all their information from the database.
A network time protocol (NTP) server is also provided and it is been run on the
SAU computer in Linux environment. It assures an uniform time for all the devices
in the system, which allows all the measurements and reports to have a valid and
reliable time stamp throughout the system. This is a vital prerequisite in order to
properly and accurately test the system, especially the validity and timeliness of
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Figure 4.1 A diagram of the demonstration system.
transported values.
In normal situation smart meters are measuring electrical energy for invoicing
purposes. In the IDE4L project they are supposed to report various measurement
values, such as active and reactive power consumption levels as well as current
and voltage magnitudes, to the SAU, AMM and meter data concentrator through
DLMS/COSEM protocol. [2] The utilization of smart meters and RTU to deliver
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measurements from the low voltage network greatly increases the possibility to mon-
itor and control the low voltage network. Added measurement capacity combined
with low voltage state estimation algorithm at the secondary substation SAU makes
it possible to increase the level of distributed automation in the low voltage network.
[17]
4.2 IEC 61850
The latest development in the substation automation technology is the IEC 61850
protocol, which is not just a communication protocol, but a complete framework of
how to engineer, specify and operate a substation automation system. Because of the
development of communication technology the communication network bandwidth
is no longer an issue and that is why the main communication method in the new
protocol is a high speed Ethernet and TCP/IP bus connecting all the IEDs in the
substation, thus reducing the need of copper wiring between devices. Biggest goals
for the standard are high-speed communication between IEDs, high-availability of
devices, interoperability of IEDs from diﬀerent manufacturers and ease of conﬁgu-
ration. [18]
Legacy substation protocols normally deﬁne the type of communication used and
how the data should be arranged within the sent package, but not how the data
should be stored and arranged within a device. This has lead to many diﬀerent kinds
of internal device conﬁgurations between manufacturers and increased the complex-
ity of the commissioning and conﬁguring of devices. All the IEDs based on the IEC
61850 standard include a same sort of internal data structure, which aims to the
multi-vendor interoperability and easier commissioning regardless of the manufac-
turer. The functionality and structure of physical IEDs or the complete IEC 61850
based substation automation system is modelled with a standard deﬁned substation
conﬁguration language (SCL). This is based on the eXstensible markup language
(XML) and includes ﬁle types of system speciﬁcation description (SSD), conﬁgured
IED description (CID), IED capability description (ICD), substation conﬁguration
description (SCD), which all have the same base construction. [18]
In IEC 61850 standard a physical device which connects to the communication
network can contain one or more logical devices, thus acting like a gateway for several
logical devices that perform their dedicated task. Each logical device contains then
one or several logical nodes, which are named service and data groups related to
some power system function. Logical nodes are divided into name groups by their
tasks so that for example all logical nodes associated with measurements begin with
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letter "M" and ones related to protection with "P". Each logical node again consist
of one or more data Elements, each with an unique name. Data Names are deﬁned
in the standard and represent some data from the power system, such as operation
counters, position indicators or measurement values. Each of the data elements
follow a speciﬁcation of the Common Data Class (CDC) deﬁned in the standard.
Every CDC contains a description of the data elements structure and type. All
the objects deﬁned in the CDC are then part of a set called Functional Constraints
(FC) that divides those attributes further into categories. IEC 61850 includes also
a variety of communication methods, which are presented in ﬁgure 4.2. [18]
Figure 4.2 Communication model of IEC 61850 standard. Adapted from [19, p. 10]
IEC 61850 oﬀers a standardized way of representing data model of IEDs with
identical way. The mapping to communication protocols is done by abstract com-
munication service interface (ACSI) models, number one in Figure 4.2, that specify
the contents of the interface and ensures an identical behaviour of diﬀerent IEDs
from the network point of view. IEC 61850 also divides the communication system
into two types of communication buses, number two in Figure 4.2: a process bus,
which connects process devices and controllers in the bay level; and station bus,
which connects process bus devices within the substation to station level devices,
such as database systems or operators. Process bus communication includes sam-
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pled value (SV) and generic object oriented substation event (GOOSE) messages,
which are considered as time critical services and are delivered in real time within
the process bus. Process bus communication is mainly considered to be limited
within a substation, but in case for example GOOSE messages are exchanged with
IEDs located away from the substation the process bus has to be extended with
virtual local area network (VLAN) to reach these IEDs. Station bus communica-
tion, section number three in Figure 4.2, can deliver messages related to network
management, but also time critical messages and it is mapped in to manufacturing
message speciﬁcation (MMS) messages and to TCP/IP. MMS, SV and GOOSE are
all transferred through Ethernet interface, but as we can see from ﬁgure 4.2 only
client-server communication is mapped to MMS and to TCP/IP. Sampled Values
are meant to deliver measurement data from measuring devices, such as current and
voltage transformers, through a merging unit (MU) that simply packs the analogue
input information and sends it as SV Process Bus communication stream through
Ethernet. SV streams and GOOSE messages are multicast to the whole network,
but only devices subscribed to the data will receive it. GOOSE messages mainly
contain time critical information, such as circuit breaker status information and
other network protection related signals and it is extremely important that these
messages are transferred in real time.
4.3 Real time digital simulator
Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) is a power system simulator from the company
RTDS Technologies Inc. and it can be utilized in real time network transient simula-
tions and for testing actual power system components such as protection or control
devices. RTDS Simulator consist of processor cards mounted in so called racks which
are then installed in a cubicle with necessary input/output cards, power supplies and
power entry components. A mid size cubicle can be seen in ﬁgure 4.3. The RTDS
system at Tampere University of Technology consist currently out of two mid sized
cubicles each containing one rack of cards.
Depending on the customers needs there are four diﬀerent cubicles available that
can house diﬀerent amount of racks. Suitable cubicle size depends on the needed sim-
ulation capability, although cubicles can also be connected to each other to further
increase the simulation capacity. All cubicles include DIN rails of various lengths for
the installation of input/output cards which provide an interface for RTDS hardware
to be connected with external devices such as protective relays or ampliﬁers. [20].
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Figure 4.3 A mid size RTDS cubicle with two racks of cards. [20]
4.3.1 Hardware
There are several cards needed in the RTDS in order to be able to run real time
network simulations. The actual calculation of the simulation model is done with
processor cards, from which a PB5 processor card is the latest. One PB5 card
contains two processors and the card is capable of simulating networks using a time
step of 50 microseconds. PB5 card is presented in ﬁgure 4.4.
RTDS includes also Giga-Transceiver input/output (GTIO) cards for interfacing
digital and analogue signals between external devices and the simulator. GTIO
cards are connected to processor cards with ﬁber optical cables and the amount and
types of GTIO depends on the devices being tested. There are four types of GTIO
cards available: GT analogue input and output cards with 12 analogue channels
available with a range of +/- 10 volts and GT digital input and output cards with
64 digital channels with a range of +5 volts to +24 volts. Figure 4.4 includes also
a picture of a GTAO card. There are also digital I/O's on the front panel of the
RTDS cubicle, which provide 16 dry contact type inputs and outputs with voltage
level of 5 volts and also 16 High Voltage outputs. High Voltage panel can provide
and receive digital signals up to 250 volts, which for example protective relays may
need to indicate breaker status.
In order to interface diﬀerent Ethernet based protocols used in the power net-
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Figure 4.4 PB5 processor card and a GT analogue output (GTAO) card. [20]
work, such as IEC 61850 GSE, there is Giga-Transceiver network communication
card (GTNET) and a newer version GTNETx2, which is capable of operating two
separate data streams and with diﬀerent protocols at the same time. Available pro-
tocols for GTNET cards are: TCP/UDP socket communication, IEEE C37.118 data
output streams, IEC 61850 GSE messaging, IEC 61850-9-2 sampled values, DNP3
communication, IEC 60870-5-104 protocol and playback of large data ﬁles.
In case the amount of I/Os needed exceeds the amount in one cubicle or there
is a need to simulate networks larger than one rack can manage to calculate it is
possible to connect several racks in to each other. In this laboratory demonstration
the network size and need for I/O interfaces exceeds the capacity of just one rack
and that is why both of the racks at the laboratory will be needed for the simulation.
In ultimate situation up to 30 racks could be connected to same system. [20]
4.3.2 Software
Actual interface to be used on a separate PC for running RTDS is provided by a
software called RSCAD, which has some similarities with some oine simulation
software such as PSCAD. With RSCAD a user can do all the network modelling,
simulation preparations, running simulations and analysing of simulation results.
RSCAD consists of following modules:
- FileManager is the main window for organizing simulation ﬁles and launching
other modules.
- Draft provides a graphical tool for network modelling simulation data input.
- RunTime is for running, controlling and acquiring results from simulations.
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- ComponentBuilder (CBuilder) makes it possible to create user-deﬁned
components.
- MultiPlot is used for post analysis and marking of results.
- Cable - Calculation of cable characteristics
- TLine - Calculation of transmission line characteristics based on positive and
zero sequence impedances or physical data.
RSCAD includes also an automated batch mode for running cases, analysing re-
sults and generating customized reports. User can deﬁne complete test sequences
and customized reporting with a script ﬁle, which is based essentially on C-programming.
RTDS supports also simulation model importing from other simulation tools such
as PSS/E and MATLAB/Simulink. [20]
4.3.3 Testing in RTDS
With RTDS it is possible to execute various test procedures depending on the system
under research. Basic idea for all the testing is real time testing, but the actual
test arrangement can be very diﬀerent if the simulator is used to test hardware or
software, or both. Two testing and simulating scenarios for RTDS are Software-
in-the-loop (SIL) and Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL), or as it is with the laboratory
demonstration of this thesis, a combination of these. [21]
HIL and SIL simulations and testing have been widely used especially in automo-
tive and aerospace industry, but systems like RTDS allow these simulations to be
used eﬀectively also in various ﬁelds of electrical engineering. Software-in-the-loop
testing aims to test the performance and functionality of a software in simulated
environment. SIL testing is not just for verifying that the software works like it is
supposed to once it is ﬁnished, but also to be used during the development of the
software. [21]
Hardware-in-the-loop simulation is a method for testing and developing control
and supervision devices for possibly complex systems, such as distribution network.
In HIL testing the system where the device under testing is supposed to be con-
nected, is modelled in a computer environment and often simpliﬁed to reduce pos-
sible errors and malfunctions caused by the simulation model itself. The interface
between the simulation and the test device is been emulated so that all the inputs for
the device seem to be coming from a real system and also control signals from device
cause corresponding actions in the model. In RTDS this emulation is executed by
vast selection of digital and analogue I/Os, communication interfaces and protocols.
In this thesis the medium voltage distribution network and the low voltage network
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with corresponding substations are modelled in RTDS and several voltage control,
measurement and protection devices are been connected as HIL test devices to the
RTDS' I/O interfaces. [22]
4.4 Integrated devices
In order to eﬀectively and extensively demonstrate CVC in a power network in lab-
oratory environment, it is crucial to also include actual control devices to the model
instead of just simulating the whole automation system. That can provide essen-
tial information about issues concerning integration and interoperability of diﬀerent
IEDs and arise possibly some actual limitations on device functionalities. Also the
SAU on both primary and secondary substation adds some complexity and connec-
tion links. In next sections there is an introduction to the most important integrated
devices in the system.
4.4.1 ABB REU615
REU615 is a voltage protection and control relay from ABB and it can have either
conﬁguration A, which is intended for voltage protection and synchronism check
in the medium voltage network, or conﬁguration B, which is designed to work as
automatic voltage controller (AVC) by controlling an on-load tap changer of a power
transformer. Both conﬁgurations provide also protection supervision and measuring
functions. In this demonstration case two REU615s are acting as AVCs on both
primary and secondary substation, and the physical appearance of the relay can be
seen in ﬁgure 4.5.
The conﬁguration of REU615 can be done by using ABB's Protection and Control
IED Manager PCM600, which is compliant with IEC 61850 and gives an opportunity
to manage several IEDs in the substation. With PCM600 user can deﬁne commu-
nication protocols and edit parameter settings of IEDs. Most of the functionalities,
for example measurements and supervision information, can also be seen from REUs
local human machine interface (LHMI) and it can also be used to access and edit
settings of the IED if needed.
REU615 supports various communication protocols such as IEC 61850, IEC
61850-9-2 LE, IEC 60870-5-103, Modbus and DNP3. REU615 includes both ver-
tical and horizontal communication of the IEC 61850 standard by supporting the
GOOSE and process-bus sampled value (SV) communication between IEDs and also
IEC 61850 MMS as a client-server communication. The IED makes also possible
to use two diﬀerent Ethernet redundancy protocols, parallel redundancy protocol
4.4. Integrated devices 30
Figure 4.5 ABB REU615 tap changer control relay. [23]
(PRP) and high availability seamless redundancy (HSR) protocol, which both rely
on duplication of all information and are able to overcome failure of a cable or a
switch in zero-switchover time. [23]
The main functionality of REU615 used in this demonstration is the capability
to control an on-load tap changer (OLTC), thus regulate the voltage of power trans-
formers lower voltage side. REU615 provides a possibility to use the manual or
automatic control scheme of the OLTC and it can control single or multiple parallel
transformers. In this demonstration there is only one single transformer on both
substations and REU615 is controlling the OLTC in automatic mode. In order to
perform OLTC control the IED needs voltage measurements from the secondary/reg-
ulated side of the transformer, in this case as sampled value communication, and
current OLTC position information as digital signal from the RTDS. Possible control
signals to change the tap position in the simulation are delivered from REU615 to
the RTDS as a digital signals. Current measurements from the secondary side would
be needed for over current protection and in case there were parallel transformers.
Although in this case since the IEC 61850-9-2LE sampled value does not yet support
the transfer of current measurements, there is only single transformer to control and
REU615 is not acting as a protection device the relay can be used without current
measurements. The connection to the SAU on the other hand is established based
on the IEC 61850 protocol with measurements being sent from REU615 to the client
at SAU as reports and possible new setpoints from the client to the REU615 are
sent as MMS messages. The control of OLTC is based on a function represented in
ﬁgure 4.6. [24]
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Figure 4.6 The theory of the automatic voltage control functionality. [24, p. 828]
Key parameters in the automatic control function are band center voltage, sort of
nominal voltage level, and bandwidth voltage, which width is entered as percentage
of the bandwidth voltage and it provides the function its control action triggering
limits. As it can be seen in ﬁgure 4.6 when the measured voltage exceeds either
higher or lower bandwidth limit a timer T1 is triggered. In case the voltage re-
turns within permissible limits, those being the hysteresis limits, before the delay
is exceeded, the timer is reset. If the voltage stays outside the bandwidth limits
long enough a control command is sent to the OLTC to either lower or raise the
tap position to restore an allowed voltage level. In case one change of the tap posi-
tion is not enough to restore permissible level, another timer T2 with often shorter
delay is triggered to schedule consecutive OLTC control signals. [24] The REU615
acts in the demonstration system autonomously controlling the voltage level of the
whole low voltage network within its functional limitations by changing the tap po-
sition, but in case it can not restore the network voltage with current conﬁguration
the power control algorithm at SAU should detect this and deﬁne a new value for
the band center voltage. In the laboratory the REU615 is providing phase voltage
measurements and tap changer position value to the SAU.
4.4.2 ABB UNITROL 1020 and HMS Labline SG10
ABB's Unitrol 1020 is an automatic voltage regulator (AVR) for the excitation of
indirectly excited synchronous machines and generators. It provides also various
possibilities for controlling and regulating reactive power, power factor and ﬁeld
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current of the motor or generator it is attached to. It takes machine voltage, current
and network voltage as inputs and then deﬁnes the level of excitation depending on
which operating mode has been selected. The AVR can be seen in ﬁgure 4.7.
Figure 4.7 The front facing view of the Unitrol 1020 AVR. [25]
Unitrol 1020 contains a PID controller for the voltage regulation and a switch-
mode power supply to generate excitation currents up to 20 amperes. AVR has
multiple operating modes, depending on how and what variable needs to be con-
trolled. When operating in Manual-mode the AVR acts as a ﬁeld-current regulator.
In AUTO-mode it keeps the output voltage level on its setting value by controlling
the level of reactive power and on the other hand when the VAR-mode is selected
the AVR keeps the reactive power level in its setting value while letting the output
voltage vary. Unitrol can also operate in PF-mode, when it regulates the power fac-
tor. The conﬁguration of the AVR can be done with a spesiﬁc software CMT1000
or through the front panel of the device. CMT1000 provides also the possibility
to observe all the measurements and events, control setpoints and tune the PID
controller while the AVR is in operation.
The device oﬀers a wide range of I/O's such as analogue and digital inputs and
outputs, excitation current output and Remote Access with Modbus TCP through
Ethernet port or with Modbus RTU through RS485 serial connection. With Modbus
Remote Access the user can access and edit all the same parameters and registers
as one can with the CMT1000 software. [25]
When integrating Unitrol to the RTDS the actual excitation current output of
the AVR can not be connected to the simulator, since it can not handle such high
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currents. Instead it is possible to get the control signal for excitation as an analogue
output from the Unitrol and that can be brought to the RTDS. In the RTDS that
signal is then fed to a model simulating the behaviour of the switch-mode power
supply of the Unitrol, thus providing same level of excitation current within the
simulation. In ﬁgure 4.8 there is presented how the integration of the AVR and
RTDS has been established.
Figure 4.8 Connection diagram of Unitrol 1020 AVR and RTDS.
In the laboratory the Unitrol receives analogue voltage and current measurement
signals from the RTDS, which are ampliﬁed to a correct level with an OMICRON
CMA 156 ampliﬁer. These signals are marked with a red colour in Figure 4.8. The
measured ﬁeld rotor current of the simulated generator from RTDS to Unitrol and
the pulse width modulated control signal for the generator ﬁeld voltage from Unitrol
to RTDS are transmitted as analogue signals without ampliﬁcation with the range
of 0-10 V. These signals are marked in the Figure 4.8 with a black colour.
In order to achieve a remote connection to Unitrol from the SAU a protocol
gateway is needed to map the information between IEC 61850 protocol used by SAU
and Modbus RTU protocol used by Unitrol. The gateway in use is a Labline SG10
from company HMS and it can be seen in ﬁgure 4.9. It oﬀers a wide range of features
for remote control and management for smart electrical systems. It supports IEC
61850 client/server, IEC60870-5-104 server, Modbus RTU master and slave, Modbus
TCP client and server protocols and oﬀers Ethernet, serial (RS232/RS485/RS422),
GSM/GPRS and digital I/O interfaces. [26]
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Figure 4.9 HMS Labline SG10 gateway used for mapping between IEC 61850 MMS and
Modbus RTU protocols. [26]
In the demonstration the SG10 is interfaced as a Modbus RTU master through
RS485 serial connection for Unitrol by reading measurement and conﬁgured setpoint
values from Unitrol's registers and writing new setpoint values to it in case provided
by the power control algorithm at the SAU. On the other side the gateway is acting
as a IEC 61850 server and delivering measurement and set point value data as reports
to the corresponding client at SAU. The actual mapping between two protocols is
done by a programmable logic controller (PLC) that is conﬁgured as function block
diagram in the web based editor of the SG10.
4.4.3 iGrid iRTU
The iRTU is a remote terminal unit (RTU) from a company iGrid T&D which has
specialized on control and automation of electrical facilities of various sizes. The
iRTU series includes a wide range of RTUs and gateways for control and supervision
of power stations and substations. An example of the devices can be seen in ﬁgure
4.10, although the iGW unit is not being used in this work.
The main tasks for devices of this series is to concentrate all data, whether it
is digital, analogue or some device protocol based, coming from diﬀerent sources
and transmit that data to deﬁned control centres or other IEDs and also to be able
to control other devices, for example switches or circuit breakers. iRTUs can be
equipped with analogue and digital inputs and outputs, but also with Ethernet in-
terface and serial ports for RS232/RS422/RS485 communication, and the capacity
of an iRTU unit can be expanded with additional iRTUe input/output extension
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Figure 4.10 Diﬀerent device models from the iRTU series: iGW-B0C1 unit (left), iRTU-
B0C1 unit (middle) and iRTUe-S0C1C1 unit (right). [27]
units. iRTUe units can include diﬀerent combinations of analogue and digital in-
puts/outputs and a total of 7 extension units can be connected to a single iRTU
unit. [27]
In the demonstration the iRTU is acting as a data concentrator; receiving ana-
logue signals from RTDS's GTAO cards representing measurement data from the
low voltage side of the secondary substation. Because RTDS is scaling its analogue
outputs as voltage in the range of -10 to 10 V with maximum output current being 5
mA and iRTU scaling its analogue inputs as current between 0-20 or 4-20 mA there
is a need to connect voltage to current converters between the RTDS and the iRTU.
The output from RTDS has to be scaled to produce signal between 0 to 5 volts,
because those converters are operating with 0 to 5 V voltage input signal coming
from RTDS and producing corresponding current output in the range of 4-20 mA
to be provided for the iRTU's analogue inputs. The iRTU is operating as a IEC
61850 server and gathers all the data from its analogue inputs in to a dataset and
sends it as a report to the SAU's IEC 61850 client. In this case the data transfer is
unidirectional from iRTU to SAU since there are no control devices attached to the
iRTU, thus no setpoints to be changed in the iRTU. In the laboratory set up the
iRTU is delivering three phase current, real power and reactive power measurements
from the secondary substation to the SAU.
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4.4.4 Smart meters
The laboratory demonstration includes also smart meters (SM) from two manufac-
turers that are connected with an ampliﬁer to analogue output ports of the RTDS.
One SM is manufactured by Landis+Gyr and another by Kamstrup; both meters
can be seen in Figure 4.11. The meter from Kamstrup is mainly designed to be used
in domestic installations where as the Landis+Gyr meter includes more features for
metering and monitoring and is more focused on industrial and other larger scale
applications.
Figure 4.11 Smart meters included in the demonstrations. On the right side Landis+Gyr
E650 [28] and on the left side Kamstrup Omnipower [29].
Both meters are equipped with three phase voltage and current measurement
interfaces and power and energy metering. The communication between the meters
and SAU is implemented by DLMS/COSEM meter reading protocol through Ether-
net interface. The DLMS/COSEM client receives following measurements from both
meters every minute: voltages, currents, real powers, reactive powers and power fac-
tors for each of the three phases as well as the complete produced and consumed
real and reactive energy of the load.
The actual measuring systems of these two meters are diﬀerent from each other
and require slightly diﬀerent connection set-up to interface them with RTDS. Lan-
dis+Gyr meter is designed to be equipped with external current and voltage mea-
surement transformers, that would reduce those signals from the real network values
to more adequate level. In this case both voltage and current signals for all three
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phases are fed directly from the ampliﬁer to the meters terminals at proper level
as they would be coming from measurement transformer. Kamstrup on the other
hand should be connected straight between feeding network and load so that voltage
and current would be at their nominal network level and all the power runs through
the meter. Voltage and current can be brought up to proper low voltage network
level with an OMICRON CMA 156 ampliﬁer, but the ampliﬁer gives out voltage
and current signals in separate cables, which requires extra components to be used
in the set-up. The connection diagram of Kamstrup meter is shown in ﬁgure 4.12.
Neutral conductor for the current signals is drawn in the ﬁgure just to represent
how it is connected in the terminals of the meter.
Figure 4.12 Connection diagram of Kamstrup meter to RTDS.
As can be seen from the ﬁgure 4.12 the ampliﬁed voltage and current signals
are coming separately from the ampliﬁer, but voltage and current signals for each
phase should be connected to same terminal at the meter as they would be in real
installation. There is also need for current transformers to raise the current level
since, although the ampliﬁer is capable of producing currents up to 25 A, it can not
produce high currents for very long time. Turn ratio of these transformers can be
changed, but in this set-up the ratio is 10/1, which gives out ten times larger current
than what is fed to them from the ampliﬁer. The connection for Landis+Gyr meter
is more simpliﬁed, because all the signals are connected to separate terminals at the
meter and the current level can be a lot lower resulting the load for the ampliﬁer to
be lower too.
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4.5 Socket interface
RTDS includes also a possibility to use Socket based communication, named GTNET-
SKT with GTNETx2 network communication cards. Socket protocol is used to form
a communication interface with external devices by using transmission control proto-
col (TCP) or user datagram protocol (UDP) sockets over wide or local area network
(WAN/LAN) [30]. In this demonstration the socket protocol is used to interface
photovoltaic (PV) power plants and static synchronous compensator (STATCOM)
modelled in RTDS, with the control interface on a computer. The socket interface
is used to deliver real and reactive power measurements from PV plants in the sim-
ulation to a computer and then deliver back control values calculated by the power
control algorithm to manage the real and reactive power levels of the plants.
In order to make the socket communication possible between the SAU and RTDS
a Matlab interface is needed to perform the mapping of the data between these two.
The Matlab is running on a separate Windows computer and it reads measurement
values from the GTNET-SKT interface of RTDS and delivers it in correct form to
the client in SAU. Then it also reads new setpoints for PV plants and STATCOMs,
if provided by PC algorithm at SAU, from the database in the SAU and sends them
back to RTDS. Both the measurement delivery as well as the setpoint checking and
writing is executed in the same loop every ﬁve seconds.
The main reason to use GTNET-SKT in this demonstration is to be able to
interface resources, which are only modelled in RTDS and do not have a real IED
controlling them, with the SAU and also to be able to get more measurement data
to the database. The amount of ampliﬁers is also one big constraint for getting
actual analogue measurements out of the RTDS, since currently there are only three
of them available. With GTNET-SKT component it is possible to get up to 300
diﬀerent values, for example measurements, from RTDS and send equal amount of
parameters to RTDS. It is also possible to use several GTNET-SKT components
which all have the same capacity, assuming there are available GTNETx2 cards in
the system.
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5. TEST CASES
The non-functional requirement testing of the automation system of IDE4L project is
done in RTDS laboratory using the demonstration system described in the chapter 3.
5.1 Availability and reliability
System can often be modelled as network of series, parallel or mesh connected com-
ponents or as a combination of all aforementioned. From a reliability point of view
components are in series if failure of one component results to failure of the whole
system that is to say all the components must work in order to the whole system
to work. Parallel components all must fail in order to cause a failure of the whole
system, thus failure of one parallel component does not cause system to fail. The
series connection is an example of a non-redundant system and parallel connection
of a fully redundant system, but often systems are a combination of both series and
parallel connections or more complex connections. The network modelling of the
reliability is in many cases referred as a reliability block diagram (RBD).[7, p. 62-63]
The reliability of a single component can be obtained by using the failure rate of
the component. Failure rate for a typical electronic component, often referred as a
bath-tub curve can be seen in Figure 5.1. The ﬁrst section of the curve represents
the period when the failure is more probable because of for example manufacturing
errors, conﬁguration errors or faulty design, section two is often referred as the
normal operating phase and faults in this section happen solely by coincidence. The
last section is fatigue or wear-out phase, where the failure rate increases signiﬁcantly
mainly because of ageing. [7, p. 134]
In this thesis the reliability and availability assessment of the automation archi-
tecture is done by focusing on the second section of the ﬁgure 5.1, namely the
normal operating phase. The RBD method is fairly simple and gives good results
for qualitative and quantitative analyses, that is why it is been used in this thesis.
Other methods could be for example fault tree, cut set and path set methods. [7] The
reliability representation can also be simpliﬁed by using parameters such as mean
time to fail (MTTF), mean time to repair (MTTR) and mean time between failures
instead of the fail rate. These parameters can be used to calculate the other impor-
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Figure 5.1 Typical failure rate of electronic components as a function of time. Adapted
from [7, p. 135]
tant system feature, availability, which can be estimated with MTTF and MTTR.
Calculation of the availability based on parameters MTTF and MTTR is as follows,
A =
MTTF
MTTF +MTTR
(5.1)
for series connected components,
As = A1 · A2 (5.2)
for parallel connected components,
Ap = A1 + A2 − A1 · A2 (5.3)
where A is the availability of the given component. [8]
MTTF values used for diﬀerent network components are listed in Table 5.1
along with corresponding availabilities. The mean time to repair (MTTR) in case of
a failure is assumed to be 8 hours and that has been used to calculate availabilities.
The reliability of communication links are considered to be very high compared to
other components in the system and because of that they are not included in the
calculations. [7], [31], [32], [33]
The automation system reliability and availability assessment is done for the lab-
oratory demonstration system described earlier in chapter4, since it is based on the
general automation architecture of IDE4L project. Because of the modular design
of the automation system there are some parallel units that in case of a failure
will not cause the whole system to fail, which increases the system reliability and
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Table 5.1 MTTF values and corresponding availabilities for system components.
Component MTTF(in years) Availability
Control IED 150 0.999993912
RTU 150 0.999993912
Smart meter 150 0.999993912
Ethernet switch 50 0.999981735
Computer
3.528 0.99632
7 0.99805
availability. The basic architecture for a distribution system operator point of view
with one primary substation and one secondary substation can be seen in Figure
5.2 as well as the RBD representation of the system. The system includes Ethernet
switches, monitoring and control IEDs, smart meters and computers. The reliability
of a computer is fairly diﬃcult to determine, since there are many components that
can fail and each have diﬀerent failure rates. Probability of failure for consumer PCs
in an extensive study [34] has shown that 1 out of 190 computers will suﬀer a failure
of CPU, which gives a MTTF of 3.528 years. The value is calculated based on the
quantity of computers studied and the duration of the study, that are 950000 com-
puters in 8 months. The computer includes also several other components that are
perhaps just as likely to fail as the CPU, but no valid studies and failure rates were
available by the time this thesis was written and that is why only the failure of CPU
is considered here. The SAU is an important part of the automation architecture,
but failure of one SAU computer does not cause the system to fail so it is assumed
that there are no replacement hardware on site. This would result to a MTTR of few
days rather than hours, while after the hardware has been acquired the computer
needs to be conﬁgured properly to be able to operate as a SAU. MTTR assumed to
be from 3 to 7 days the availability is then between 0.99768 and 0.99460 giving an
average of 0.99632.
In the actual laboratory set up there is no control center or SCADA system avail-
able, so calculations are done only for SAU units. In actual set up both PSAU and
SSAU are actually located in one single computer, but for this assessment they are
considered to be separated and connected to each other through an Ethernet switch
as seen in Figure 5.2. Although many of the devices in Figure 5.2 are physically
parallel connected, they are in terms of monitoring and control functionality in se-
ries. All the components need to be operational for the system to operate as it
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(a) Devices
(b) Model 1
(c) Model 2
Figure 5.2 Network model of the automation system in laboratory and the RBD repre-
sentations used for the reliability analysis.
should. The devices can be modelled to be also functionally in parallel, since failure
of one device is not causing the whole system to fail, but it decreases the accuracy
of monitoring and state estimation and possibly aﬀects the amount of controllable
devices. In Figure 5.2 are presented both RBD models used in calculations: all
devices in series and all control devices in series. Calculations were done for several
operational states, which are listed in Table 5.2 along with corresponding results.
When the calculations are done for the whole system including both SAU com-
puters and a switch connecting them, as in Figure 5.2, and assuming that every
device needs to work in order to make the system work properly, it is clear that
especially MTTF is greatly reduced compared to the values for individual compo-
nents. The main reason for this is the low MTTF for computers, which can be clearly
seen from the availability values calculated separately for SSAU and PSAU. Values
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Table 5.2 Reliabilities and availabilities for the complete automation system as well as
for diﬀerent parts of it. Values with twice longer MTTF for the pc are also included for
comparison. The model number refers to RBD models presented in Figure 5.2.
Section Model MTTF Availability MTTF PC
Whole system 1 1.88 0.99996642 3.528
PSAU only 1 3.09 0.99610186 3.528
SSAU only 1 2.80 0.99607154 3.528
Whole system 2 1.90 0.99996654 3.528
SSAU only 2 2.85 0.99610186 3.528
Whole system 1 3.13 0.99997774 7
PSAU only 1 5.47 0.99801649 7
SSAU only 1 4.63 0.99798611 7
Whole system 2 3.17 0.99997780 7
SSAU only 2 4.74 0.99801649 7
were calculated also for scenario where control devices must all be operational, but
purely monitoring related IEDs can have failure without causing the whole system
to fail. This means that iRTU and lv cabinet switch along with the smart meter are
connected in parallel with control devices. This scenario aﬀects RBD model only
at SSAU, since at PSAU there are only control IEDs. As can be seen from Table
5.2 this scenario improves the MTTF of both the SSAU and whole system by about
1%. One fairly simple way to improve the system would be to add redundancy to
the communication system by duplicating Ethernet switches, which results to paral-
lel connection of two switches. By duplicating the Ethernet switches between SAU
computers and IEDs all the MTTF would be increased by around 2%. By dupli-
cating the switch between SAUs would increase the MTTF for the whole system by
1.3% and if all the switches were duplicated the overall MTTF would increase by
3.4%. The duplication of Ethernet switches does not have any signiﬁcant aﬀect on
the availability.
Since the reliability of computers is signiﬁcantly lower than other components
the Table 5.2 includes also same MTTF and availability calculations with roughly
twice as long MTTF time for computers for comparison. The failure rate value
obtained from [34] is based on only consumer computers and includes a large variety
of hardware, which could result to unnecessarily high failure rate. When observing
the values calculated with MTTF of 7 years the eﬀect on the MTTF values of the
whole system is clear with MTTF for SSAU being increased 65% to 4.63 years, for
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PSAU 76.9% to 5.47 years and for the whole system 65.8% to 3.13 years. Another
critical variable is the MTTR for the computers, which will aﬀect the availability
of the system. The original 120 hours or 5 days is fairly conservative and could
be decreased. In case the MTTR could be decreased to 48 hours it would increase
the availability of SAUs with 0.3% and the whole system by 0.0015% resulting an
availability of 0.99998105.
All the MTTF values for IEDs and Ethernet switches were from studies focusing
mainly on communication and operation within a substation and because of this the
values are possibly too optimistic. Also the assumption that communication links
are extremely reliable might not be true, since some of the IEDs in the network
are not connected to the SAU with Ethernet based communication links, but more
likely with some public wireless connections. Analysis of reliability and availability
is executed here with the data available , but for further development these aspects
should be noted.
5.2 Resource utilisation and scalability
The performance of the automation system and ability to expand are important
requirements for a decentralized system and are highly dependent on the resource
utilisation of the system. In this case resources on the system are communication
network capacity and speed as well as computing capacity of the SAU computer.
Both remaining network capacity and computing capacity are decreased as the sys-
tem size increases, which results to longer computing times and possibly congestion
in the communication network. At some point the system exceeds its operational
limits and can not increase in size any more and this would be important and prac-
tical to predict by analysing the scalability of the system.
The resource utilisation analysis for the laboratory set up is executed by studying
the communication network bandwidth usage of diﬀerent devices and interfaces. The
IEC 61850 communication generates the most frequent traﬃc to the network, since
all the measurements from the IEDs are delivered to the client with 5 second interval.
The Figure 5.3 presents the IEC 61850 based traﬃc of all ﬁve IEDs.
The main communication link in the IDE4L automation architecture is Ethernet
based, which is with its bandwidth of 100 Mbit/s or higher more than capable of
delivering all messages between devices and is highly unlikely to develop into a limi-
tation regarding system scalability. This can be seen also from the Figure 5.3 where
the ﬁrst graph presents the communication bandwidth usage for all the available 5
IEDs and the client in total and as reports only. In this case the average band-
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(a) All client/server traﬃc.
(b) Reports from diﬀerent IEDs
Figure 5.3 Bandwidth usage of client/server communication of ﬁve IEDs and bandwidth
usage of reporting from diﬀerent IED types.
width usage when considering all traﬃc is only about 9.5 kbit/s and for reporting
only little over 4 kbit/s. Although it must be noted that as the second graph in
Figure 5.3 shows the bandwidth usage of reports from diﬀerent devices have major
diﬀerences depending on the amount of measurements included in the report. When
comparing the two graphs it is clear that the reporting from iRTU is responsible
for most of the report based communication traﬃc. If the amount of data from all
the IEDs as a report would be at the same level as the reports coming from iRTU
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the bandwidth usage would be about 17.5 kbit/s resulting to 27 kbit/s for all the
client/server traﬃc with ﬁve IEDs. It is still a small amount of data and uses only
about 0.027 % of 100 Mbit/s bandwidth.
The IEC 61850 communication is not all the data that is transferred in the com-
munication network, while also the measurements from smart meters to DLMS/-
COSEM client are transmitted in the same network. The reading frequency for
smart meters in the laboratory set up is much lower than the one for IEC 61850
IEDs, being deﬁned at 30 seconds. The Figure 5.4 shows the bandwidth usage of
the two smart meters and although the interval for measurement reading is longer
the amount of data diﬀers from the ones delivered by the IEC 61850 reporting.
Figure 5.4 Bandwidth usage of the DLMS/COSEM communication between two smart
meters and the client.
Both Kamstrup and Landis+Gyr meters are delivering same measurements to the
DLSM/COSEM client at SAU, namely voltage, current, power, reactive power and
power factor for each phase as well as consumed and produced energy values. Even
though the measurements are identical the Figure 5.4 clearly reveals the signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in bandwidth usage for these two meters as the Landis+Gyr meter uses
almost six times more bandwidth as the Kamstrup. As the amount of smart meters
in the network is vast, when all the households are equipped with one, the diﬀerence
in the bandwidth usage could aﬀect the communication capacity and performance
quite easily. To prevent the possible congestion in the network the reading interval
could be increased or a measurement data aggregation device used to collect the
data from a group of meters. The Kamstrup meter also represents more a device
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installed in households and Landis+Gyr with more features and better accuracy a
meter that is intended for larger and commercial locations.
Important thing to consider is also the resource utilisation of SAU computer,
namely CPU and memory usage of all the processes needed. The computer at the
laboratory is quite well equipped with quadcore Intel i7 processor and 16 GB of
RAM memory as well as a 250 Gb SSD hard drive. The resource utilisation of the
SAU computer is studied in this thesis by observing the CPU usage of the functions
and interfaces running on that computer in the laboratory. Figure 5.5 represents
the CPU usage of state estimation algorithm and power control algorithm. The
usage is represented in percent and the CPU of the laboratory computer has four
physical cores and each core can handle two threads, which results to eight digital
cores and because of that the complete processing capacity is 800%.
(a) Only PC
(b) Comparison of PC and SE
Figure 5.5 The CPU usage of algorithms. First graph represents only the PC and the
second one includes one operating cycle for both SE and PC to compare them.
It is clear from the two graphs in Figure 5.5 that the most demanding func-
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tionality on the SAU computer is the power control algorithm. At some points it
is reserving over half of the CPU capacity and an average usage for one operating
cycle is around 400% for 20 seconds. In second graph of the Figure 5.5 one oper-
ating cycle for both SE and PC is plotted for comparison. The average usage for
the SE is around 150 to 200% for about two seconds, which is signiﬁcantly less than
the corresponding values for the PC. The Figure 5.6 shows the CPU usage of the
database and although it is occasionally using large amount of CPU, most of the
time it is only few percent. The CPU usage of the two communication interfaces,
namely IEC 61850 and DLMS/COSEM clients are presented in Figure 5.7 with
same representation of percentage values.
Figure 5.6 CPU usage of the database.
Both clients are very light to process once they are initialised and operating
normally, as can be seen from Figure 5.7. Without considering the two high spikes
appearing in the graph of the DLMS/COSEM client the computational need is very
low at around 10% maximum. The IEC 61850 clients CPU usage is presented in
the lower graph of the Figure 5.7 and it is on average only about four percent
of the total 800% of the CPU capacity. In addition to the conclusions made in the
reliability and availability analysis in section 5.1 the CPU usage studies also indicate
that the type and performance of the SAU computer should be taken into serious
consideration when setting up the system.
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(a) DLMS client
(b) 61850 client
Figure 5.7 The CPU usage of the two client interfaces at the SAU.
5.3 Errors and failures
All tests are conducted for the low voltage network and with SSAU only, since the
functionality and interfaces are practically identical for both SAUs.
5.3.1 Connection failures
Connection between devices can be lost because of cable breakage or complete or
partial device failure, for example failure of connection interfaces or communication
ports. Communication links were assumed to have 100% reliability when reliability
and availability of the complete automation system was analysed in section 5.1,
but in reality they can fail despite being highly reliable. If multiple devices or
crucial communication links fail at the same time, for example one centrally located
Ethernet switch with no redundant connection, the system will eventually fail to
operate, but in reasonable limits the system needs to be able to stay operable also
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in these situations and recover after the interruption is over. In laboratory tests both
the IEC 61850 client and the DLMS/COSEM client developed for the SAU in this
project were proven to be robust once conﬁgured properly and to be able to operate
and recover when some or all of the connections to IEDs would fail. The failure of
communication connections to IEDs can result to false or inaccurate measurements
or deteriorate the level of network control, depending on the IED type.
The loss of measurement data because of failed communication link does not
lead to the failure of SAU or network control, but when fewer measurement data
is delivered to the SAU the accuracy of state estimation algorithm decreases. In
Figure 5.8 for one node of the low voltage network is represented the eﬀect of lost
measurements to the accuracy and behaviour of state estimation. The simulation
scenario in all situations is the same 10 minute run, where only the production of
photovoltaic (PV) units is ﬁrst at 150 seconds decreased by 70%, then at 270 seconds
brought back at original level and then at 510 seconds decreased by 70% again.
State estimator algorithm is capable of calculating an estimate for network state
even without any real time measurements based only on the data received from the
load and production forecaster algorithm. In this case the estimate is of course much
more inaccurate than with all measurements available. In Figure 5.8 are presented
both actual voltage in the simulation and the voltage estimate of the low voltage
state estimator in three diﬀerent situations. First graph is from the situation when
all the measurements are available for the state estimator and it servers as a base case
for comparison. In the base case the estimate follows the actual voltage very closely.
Although there are some sections where the voltage changes in the network, but
estimate does not update until the start of next minute when the algorithm is rerun.
The other two graphs represent diﬀerent situations where some of the real time
measurements are missing for some reason. In graph b) the voltage measurement
from the low voltage bus of the secondary substation is missing and in graph c) all
the real and reactive power measurements from photovoltaic plants are missing. The
lack of substation voltage measurement causes clearly a somewhat constant error on
the estimate, in a way that it is always higher than the actual voltage. The error of
the state estimation is slightly diﬀerent when all power measurements are missing
from the PV units. In this case the estimate is quite accurate when the production
is at its nominal level, but has some error when the production is decreased. One
way to investigate the performance of the state estimator is with a key performance
indicator (KPI) deﬁned in the IDE4L project [35], which equation is as follows,
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(a) All measurements available.
(b) Voltage measurement from SS missing
(c) PV power measurements missing.
Figure 5.8 Diﬀerent scenarios of the eﬀect of missing measurements
LV SE =
1
N
N∑
n=1
√√√√ 1
T
T∑
t=1
(x˜(t)n − x(t)n)2 (5.4)
where N is the number of studied state variables, T is the number of time intervals
under study, x˜(t)n is the real instantaneous value of a state variable at time t and
x(t)n is the estimated value of a state variable at time t. The state variable in this
case under study is the network voltage and the KPI gives a performance index
for the state estimator accuracy. [35] The Table 5.3 includes calculated KPI values
and their diﬀerence to the base case value for diﬀerent scenarios including the ones
represented in the Figure 5.8.
At the time the testing of the low voltage state estimator was done there was
no load and production forecaster operational at the laboratory and the pseudo
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Table 5.3 KPI values calculated for the low voltage state estimator and their diﬀerence
to the base case.
Scenario KPI [V] Diﬀerence [%]
Base case 0.56121 0
No SS voltage 0.73263 30.55
No PV powers 0.61162 8.98
measurements representing the input from the forecaster were hard coded to the
state estimator algorithm. This has an eﬀect on the accuracy of the estimate when
the state in the network changes from the nominal and some measurements are
missing. This can be seen especially in the graph c) in Figure 5.8 where the
PV production changes and there is no measurements available from PV units,
which results to higher voltage estimate than the actual value because the pseudo
measurement for all PV units is higher than the actual value. The current method
for predicting load and production changes in the network is based on load curves
determined for diﬀerent customer types.
5.3.2 Measurement error
Even when all the measurements are available there can be erroneous measurements
because of inadequate connections or calibrations, which would result the measure-
ments to be constantly inaccurate. The other reason for measurement errors is some
sort of malfunction of a device or measurement instruments. The state and condi-
tion of measuring instruments, such as instrument transformers or cables, can be
monitored and that way prevent possible failures, but measurement errors caused
by a device malfunction, for example software error, are practically impossible to
predict since they happen purely out of coincidence. By monitoring measured values
from devices and comparing them to corresponding actual values in the simulation
the equation 5.4 can be used to obtain the magnitude of error for each parameter.
Table 5.4 includes measurements from diﬀerent devices and with diﬀerent reading
frequencies where it has been possible to change.
The iRTU device is conﬁgured to receive analogue signals from RTDS that repre-
sent three phase power and reactive power as well as current measurements from the
secondary substation. Measurements are sent from the device as IEC 61850 reports,
that are as default conﬁgured to be sent every ﬁve seconds. The Table 5.4 includes
average three phase errors for all monitored variables for iRTU and it is clear that
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Table 5.4 Measurement error for each IED with diﬀerent reading frequencies.
5 s 10 s 15 s 30 s 60 s
iRTU, [A] 5.94 8.94 11.08 17.10 23.20
iRTU, [kW] 1.93 3.54 4.31 6.62 8.34
iRTU, [kVAr] 1.28 1.34 1.45 1.80 2.68
Kamstrup, [V] - - - 0.284 -
Kamstrup, [A] - - - 0.186 -
Landis+Gyr, [V] - - - 0.275 -
Landis+Gyr, [A] - - - 0.074 -
the reading frequency has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the measurement accuracy. When
the cycle time is increased to ten seconds the average error for current for example
is increased by 50%, which is fairly large increase. Even with ﬁve second frequency
the error for these variables is fairly large, but that can be explained quite well by
focusing on the moments when the measured variables change in the simulation.
The Figure 5.9 shows the behaviour of current measurements sent as a report from
iRTU. The current for phase B is not visible in the graph, since it is exactly the
same as the value for phase C.
Figure 5.9 Measurement error from iRTU. Caused by non-simultaneous measurement
data update.
For some reason all the phase measurements are not updated at the same mo-
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ment in the report sent from iRTU, although the state of each phase is changed
simultaneously in the simulation. This results a situation presented in Figure 5.9,
where ﬁrst the current is increased in the simulation and shortly after the report
including new current measurements is transmitted to the SAU, but only phases
B and C are actually containing the new current value. The measurement for the
phase A is updated when the next report is sent after the deﬁned cycle time. This
delay occurs also for other measured variables and with other reading frequencies.
This evidently explains the high error for the measurements even with high read-
ing frequency and it has more signiﬁcant eﬀect with longer cycle times. When the
network state is constant the errors for the variables monitored by iRTU are much
better being roughly 0.6 amperes, 0.6 kW and 0.5 kVAr. The measuring accuracy
for Landis+Gyr and Kamstrup smart meters were also calculated and corresponding
errors are listed in the Table 5.4. Smart meters are both operating in our laboratory
demonstration with 30 second reading frequency and are delivering voltage, current,
power and energy measurements to SAU with DLMS/COSEM protocol. With this
frequency the measuring error for voltage and current is very small. As described
in section 4.4.4 the physical connections to the RTDS for these two meters are lit-
tle diﬀerent from each other, because of diﬀerent measuring interfaces. This would
most likely explain the diﬀerence in the current measurement, as the Landis+Gyr
meter is connected directly to the ampliﬁer where as the current for Kamstrup is fed
through a current transformer. The error for voltage measurement is on the other
hand almost identical and measured phase voltages as well as the actual voltage in
the RTDS simulation can be seen in Figure 5.10.
Although the voltage measurement error for both smart meters is almost the
same when calculated for a three phase average, the actual measuring accuracy of
the measurements sent to the DLMS client is diﬀerent. This can be clearly seen
from Figure 5.10 while the accuracy of the Landis+Gyr meter is 0.01 volts and the
voltage curve follows the equivalent curve of the simulated voltage, but the voltage
measurements sent from Kamstrup have the accuracy of only 1 volt so in this case
it goes either over or under the simulated voltage. For the clarity of the situation
the graph presenting the voltage measurement for Kamstrup meter is showing the
measured value for phase A only.
5.3.3 Time Performance
Time synchronization is one essential part of any control system and especially
important for decentralized systems, because all the devices and resources are not
5.3. Errors and failures 55
(a) Landis+Gyr
(b) Kamstrup
Figure 5.10 Voltage measurements from Landis+Gyr and Kamstrup smart meters and
corresponding voltage levels in RTDS.
in the same physical place, but they still need to communicate and operate with each
other. If there is no synchronization or the accuracy of it is too low for the intended
purpose devices might not be able to work or they will not work properly. There are
diﬀerent levels of synchronization accuracy needed depending on the application.
While IEC 61850 based substation level process bus communication via sampled
values or GOOSE messages requires synchronization accuracy of nanoseconds, many
devices and systems can operate adequately with accuracy of second or milliseconds.
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Since there are no protection or similar more time critical devices in the laboratory
demonstrations the synchronization is performed with NTP server that can provide
synchronization accuracy of few hundred milliseconds or better. The Figure 5.11
represents a situation where there are practically no actual synchronization between
the SAU and the simulator and its eﬀect on the performance of the state estimator
algorithm at simulation situation as well as the result with proper synchronization.
Figure 5.11 Eﬀect of poor time synchronization of the system to state estimator perfor-
mance.
The simulation run in the Figure 5.11 started at the beginning of a minute,
which results the new state estimation to be calculated at 120 seconds, shortly
after the voltage has changed in the system. In this case the synchronization is
around 30 seconds oﬀ and causes the estimated voltage to stay at the old level
that much longer. The error for the synchronized estimate is 0.397 V and for the
non-synchronized almost twice as large 0.631 V within the timespan shown in the
graph. This issue is however present only at the laboratory and makes the processing
of the simulation results more complicated, while in the real network chances in
network state happen randomly. This test is more about the overall importance of
synchronization in automation systems and provides an example of possible outcome
when the synchronization is poor.
To perform adequately the system needs to be not only synchronized, but also
perform its tasks and communication within reasonable time limits. The perfor-
mance of the communication link and IEDs can be observed by measuring response
time for a message sent from client to the IED. Results are shown in Table 5.5
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for diﬀerent IEDs. The tests were conducted by both reading speciﬁc values from
the IED and also by changing some parameters in the IED conﬁguration. While
the iRTU does not have any conﬁguration that could be controlled with the client
and ultimately the response times were practically identical for both monitoring and
control for other IEDs only one value was calculated for each device.
Table 5.5 Average delay times for IED response.
IED Response time [ms]
REU615 4.23
HMS SG10 and Unitrol > 500
iRTU 69.07
The REU615 is clearly the fastest to response and execute parameter changes
requested by the client with only few millisecond delay in the communication. The
iRTU has signiﬁcantly longer delay for communication, although all the requests
from client were related to only monitoring and measurement reading and not con-
ﬁguration changes. The IEC 61850 server interface deﬁned by the SCL-ﬁle on the
iRTU is most likely slower and not as reﬁned as the one provided by the man-
ufacturer on the REU615, which could explain the longer response time for the
iRTU. The iRTU is also not fully designed based on the IEC 61850 standard like
the REU615 and may have some delay because of internal communication and data
mapping between the server interface and rest of the device. The very long delay
for the combination of Unitrol 1020 and the HMS SG10 gateway is mainly caused
by the limitation of the Modbus RTU connection between the gateway and Unitrol.
Modbus Master interface at the gateway reads all the deﬁned parameters from the
registers of the Unitrol on each predeﬁned cycle that has to last long enough to
be able to read all values. If the time for the reading cycle is too short the Mod-
bus master can not get all the required parameters and enters an error state. The
reading cycle time for the gateways Modbus interface is deﬁned at 500 ms which is
as short as possible and results inevitably to response times of over 500 ms. Also
the gateway adds some delay to the communication, while the parameter mapping
between IEC 61850 and Modbus protocol is achieved with a PLC running on a bus
cycle time of 25 ms. If a new set point is provided for the Unitrol by the SAU it
is fairly fast when it has been changed in the register, but the overall time when
the information of the changed value is transmitted back to the client is very long
compared to the other devices in the laboratory.
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5.4 Commissioning and IEC 61850 characteristics
There are several very diﬀerent devices when considering the commissioning of them.
Physical connections to the RTDS are not considered in this section, because they are
already introduced in Section 4.4. This section focuses on the internal commissioning
work for IEDs and their communication interfaces and also the interoperability of
devices based on the IEC 61850 standard.
IEC 61850 is the main protocol being used in the automation system of IDE4L
project and most of the devices support this standard. Although IEC 61850 stan-
dard is aiming for eﬀortless and seamless integration of IEDs and other services
regardless of the manufacturer it still leaves quite a bit of room for interpretations,
thus leading to very diﬀerent implementations of the standard. Depending on the
manufacturer and on their way of understanding the standard the actual commis-
sioning work needed for diﬀerent IED's vary greatly. When comparing the IEDs in
the laboratory system it can be calculated on average how much work the commis-
sioning and parameter setting of each device requires, which can be seen in table 5.6.
This examination leaves out diﬀerences between conﬁguration software provided by
manufacturers, that include very diﬀerent approaches and user-friendliness levels,
but are extremely diﬃcult to compare.
Table 5.6 Number of parameters that need to be conﬁgured when commissioning each
device and if an additional SCL ﬁle is needed to enable IEC61850 compatibility.
Device Number of parameters SCL ﬁle needed
REU615 30 yes
iRTU 80 yes
Unitrol 1020 20 no
HMS SG10 gateway 30 yes
The laboratory test set up includes devices from all diﬀerent categories in terms of
IEC 61850 standard compatibility. The REU615 AVC is the only device that is fully
based on the standard and all the functions and interfaces are designed accordingly.
The iRTU on the other hand is not completely based on the standard, which makes
it more ﬂexible to operate with diﬀerent protocols and in diﬀerent applications, but
it also adds up the conﬁguration work needed to make it function properly. The
iRTU can be conﬁgured to have an IEC 61850 server interface which can then be
internally mapped to receive measurements from devices physical I/O-interfaces or
deliver commands and information to the device sent from external IEC 61850 client.
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This requires user to create a proper code for the server interface with SCL-language.
The REU615 also requires the SCL-ﬁle to deﬁne the functionality of the IED, but
that is automatically created and uploaded to the device by the conﬁguration tool
and requires no actual coding from the user. The Unitrol 1020 AVR on the other
hand is based on Modbus protocol and does not support the IEC 61850 protocol
at all and the remote connection for monitoring and control is established through
a serial cable with Modbus RTU. To make it compatible with other devices and
SAU the HMS SG10 protocol gateway is needed to map these two protocols with
each other. The gateway is similar with the iRTU when it comes to compatibility,
because it is capable of supporting multiple protocols and interfaces and also needs
user to provide the SCL-ﬁle for the IEC 61850 server interface. The commissioning
work needed for each device to make them operable in the laboratory set up is
presented in Table 5.6 as estimates of internal conﬁguration parameter changes and
deﬁnitions done for devices. REU615 and Unitrol 1020 require roughly the same
amount of parameters to be conﬁgured, but to make the remote connection to the
SAU possible for the Unitrol the HMS gateway needs to be conﬁgured too, which
makes the combination more complicated than the REU615 on the commissioning
point of view. The most ﬂexible and versatile device in the laboratory set-up is the
iRTU, which makes it also quite time and work consuming device to commission. It
can be clearly seen from the numbers at Table 5.6 that the amount of parameters
to be conﬁgured is much larger than with other devices, since the device comes with
practically no preconﬁgured settings or interfaces.
The HMS gateway and the iRTU require the user to provide the SCL-ﬁle de-
scribing the IEC 61850 server interface, thus increasing the amount of work for
commissioning notably. The HMS comes with an example SCL-ﬁle of the server
interface that can be used as a template and modify it to get the SCL-ﬁle needed
for the application. The iRTU does not have any template or example ﬁle provided.
The interoperability of devices from diﬀerent manufacturers could not be tested,
since all the communication at the laboratory set-up was deﬁned only between IEDs
and SAU.
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6. DISCUSSION
This chapter provides more discussion about results presented in Chapter 5 and
aims to further combine and link the test results with each other. Also possibilities
for future work are listed and discussed.
6.1 Summary of test results
Various test were performed to the laboratory system to validate its performance and
non-functional requirements. One key feature to any automation system is reliability
and along that availability. These requirements were observed with more theoretical
and mathematical approach than most of the other features and a reliability block
diagram was used as a basis for this assessment. In general the decentralization of
the system and large amount of diﬀerent measurement points in the network make
the system very reliable. Diﬀerent scenarios were studied including assumptions
that all devices have to work in order to the whole system to operate properly and
that only control devices all have to work. Calculations for diﬀerent sections of
the system were also conducted and eﬀect of redundant communication devices. In
reality the system is capable of operating even though some of the devices or even
a SAU would be lost, but lost of monitoring devices has an eﬀect on the accuracy
of state estimation as further tests prove and loss of control devices deteriorates
the controllability of the network possibly resulting the hosting capacity for DERs
to decrease. The most unreliable component of the system is clearly the computer
where each SAU will be operating and with failure rate acquired from a study [34]
the mean time to fail (MTTF) for the whole system was eventually only 1.88 years,
while for individual components other than the PC it is in the range of 50 to 150
years. Same values were calculated for the whole system with twice as long MTTF
for the PC and the corresponding value for the system was increased by almost 66%.
The assumption of longer MTTF for the computer was based on the fact that the
study where it was originally acquired from included only consumer PCs and for
substation automation use the PC would be more reliable industrial type PC.
The eﬀect of device and communication failures along with measurement errors
was tested with the laboratory set up and included low voltage network model and
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SSAU, since the situation is very similar in the mid voltage network with only fewer
devices but identical interfaces and features on the PSAU. Both IEC 61850 and
DLMS/COSEM client interfaces were proven to be robust once properly conﬁgured
and to be able to withstand and recover from the loss of connection to some or all
of the server devices. The loss of connection to the ﬁeld devices does not result to
the failure of the state estimator, but aﬀects the accuracy of the estimate. Diﬀerent
measurement loss situations and their eﬀect on the average error of the estimate
was studied and in all the cases the error for example in node voltage was below
0.004 pu. Errors in measurements and the eﬀect of reading frequency to the er-
ror was tested with various device and this revealed also some inaccuracies on the
measurement delivery to the client at SAU. Measurement error for both Kamstrup
and Landis+Gyr meters turned out be very small, with around 0.28 V for voltage
on both meters and current 0.186 A for Kamstrup and a lot smaller 0.074 A for
the Landis+Gyr. The diﬀerence on the current measurement accuracy is probably
caused by the diﬀerence on physical connections to the RTDS, since Kamstrup needs
additional current transformers between the ampliﬁer and meter terminals. Even
though the three phase average of the measured quantities are very close to each
other on both meters the measurement accuracy of the data transmitted to the SAU
database is very diﬀerent. Accuracy for current on both meters is 0.01 A, but volt-
age measurement accuracy is 0.01 V for Landis+Gyr and only 1 V for Kamstrup. If
the voltage measurement of a smart meter would be from an important node in the
network and accurate value is assumed to be available this feature should be taken in
to consideration when deciding the meter type. Tests for the iRTU device revealed
fairly big errors even with default 5 second reading interval and further examination
showed that the reporting of measurements from the device had issues. Turned out
that not all the phase measurements for one network quantity were updated at the
same time, despite the simultaneous change of parameters in the simulation.
Tests conducted on the communication interfaces showed that the Ethernet based
communication network is more than capable of transmitting all the necessary data
for the system. On an actual network set up, on the other hand, some of the devices
would be connected to the SAU with some other communication link than Ethernet
and this can will have an eﬀect on the time behaviour, accuracy and eﬃciency of the
system. The analysis of the CPU usage of algorithms, database and communication
interfaces at the SAU revealed that most of the instances running on the computer
are not using more than 10% out of the available 800% of CPU capacity. Both SE
and PC algorithms on the other hand reserve most of the processing capacity when
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they are running and PC is by far the most demanding process with average usage
of half of the processing power for about 20 seconds during every run cycle and
peaking momentarily close to 800%.
Time synchronization of the SAU and all the IEDs is carried out with a NTP
server located on the SAU PC. It provides time with adequate accuracy for the sys-
tem to operate properly, but on the demonstration purpose one simulation situation
was presented to illustrate the eﬀect of poor or complete lack of synchronization
to the operation of the state estimator. The time behaviour of IEDs was studied
by examining the response time for a message sent from the client. Devices turned
out to have very diﬀerent delays on the response time, while the REU615 relay re-
sponded in few milliseconds to all of the requests the same actions took around 70
milliseconds for the iRTU and above 500 milliseconds for the combination of HMS
SG10 gateway and Unitrol 1020. Explanation for the signiﬁcantly longer response
time for the Unitrol is caused by the way the Modbus RTU connection operates
between the gateway and the Unitrol, since it has a 500 ms operating time each
time something is read or written to the registers of the Unitrol. The data map-
ping between IEC 61850 and Modbus protocol at the HMS gateway increases the
response time too. The longer response time of the iRTU when compared to the
REU615 is probably result of lower performance IEC 61850 server interface. The
fact that not all of the IEDs are fully based on the IEC 61850 standard - that is
used as as a main standard in this architecture - results to some constraints in the
system and especially increase the work needed to integrate all the devices to the
system.
The work needed to commission and integrate diﬀerent devices into the system
has big variation depending on the devices speciﬁcations and is an important feature
to study. The range of devices integrated to the laboratory demonstration represent
completely diﬀerent types of IEDs when it comes to integration of them to the IEC
61850 standard based automation system. Some idea of the work needed for the
commissioning of each IED were illustrated by presenting and comparing the amount
of parameter changes and deﬁnitions needed to make the device operable. The REU
615 is purely based on the IEC 61850 standard and requires the least amount of work
to commission when it comes to setting changes. The Unitrol 1020 requires roughly
the same amount of parameter changes ad the REU 615, but to integrate it with
the IEC 61850 standard the HMS SG10 protocol gateway is needed which almost
doubles the amount of settings to be edited. The iRTU is the most ﬂexible device
of the set up and is capable of operating with several protocols and interfaces, but
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mainly because of that it is also the most labour intensive. The HMS gateway as
well as the iRTU both support several communication and automation protocols and
the IEC 61850 server interface needs to be speciﬁcally conﬁgured with a SCL-ﬁle,
which needs to be created by the user. This requires more expertise and increases
the commissioning work of the IED. As described earlier the lack of preconﬁgured
SCL-ﬁle and IEC 61850 server interface from the manufacturer may also result to
constraints on time performance or device operating accuracy when integrating the
IED to IEC 61850 based automation system. Although the interoperability and
ease of commission of IEDs is one of the main goals of the IEC 61850 standard it
seems to leave some room for interpretations which result to devices that need very
diﬀerent amount of work to make them interoperable with the IEC 61850 protocol.
6.2 Recommendations for future work
All the tests conducted in this thesis apart from the reliability and availability
analysis were done only for the low voltage network and SSAU, since the complete
system including mid voltage network and PSAU was not available at the laboratory
set up by the time the test were made. Because of the modular design of the
automation architecture the functionalities and interfaces are almost identical for
the SSAU and PSAU so test results presented in this thesis apply also to the PSAU,
but the integration and co-operation of the two SAU units should be also tested.
Further non-functional requirement tests should also be developed and executed.
Especially the scalability of the system should be tested and studied, while that
is a crucial feature for a decentralized automation system that is designed to be
expanded with minimal eﬀort if needed. The challenge is to develop a method
that would preferably oﬀer results based on rather small scale laboratory tests with
only couple of devices. Some possible parts of the system were listed and studied
in this thesis that could be the possible bottlenecks of the system from scalability
point of view, but no actual results were presented. Larger scale tests with more
physical devices would also provide more information about the systems behaviour
and constraints, but are quite diﬃcult to carry out in the laboratory environment.
The behaviour of the real time monitoring and state estimation was tested in
situation where some of the measurements or devices were completely missing be-
cause of communication failure. The eﬀect of poor connection quality or partial loss
of communication is something that would be good to test, but rather diﬃcult to
realize in laboratory environment where all the communication is carried out with
rather short Ethernet cables and fast interfaces. This is however possible scenario
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in actual ﬁeld installations where all of the communication may not be possible to
implement with Ethernet connections especially because of the geographical distri-
bution of the system. Further comparison to other systems and especially to legacy
distribution systems with centralized architecture should be done regarding all the
features tested in this thesis.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis introduced a novel decentralized distribution automation system devel-
oped in IDE4L project and described the building of laboratory set up to demon-
strate and test the system before ﬁeld testing. The laboratory demonstration system
and IEDs involved in the set up were presented and the integration of devices into
the RTDS and SAU was explained. This thesis includes also various test results
from the laboratory set up to study and deﬁne crucial non-functional requirements
(NFR) for a decentralized automation system like the one in question.
The complete laboratory set up was introduced and the functionalities of IEDs
and the SAU explained. Not all of the IEDs were involved in the actual monitoring
and control simulations of the network at the time of testing, but the NFR testing
for the automation system was still possible to execute since all the connections
and interfaces were operational. The NFR testing of the system did not reveal any
critical weaknesses or constraints in the automation system and it proved to be
reliable and robust. Biggest issues were related to measurement accuracy of some
devices and to IEC 61850 standard compatibility and commissioning. Measurement
accuracy tests showed that one device did not send updated measurement values
for all the phases at the same reading cycle and caused unexpected error to the
measurements in the database. The reason for this behaviour remained unclear,
but one explanation could be the IEC 61850 server interface at the IED that is not
provided by the manufacturer but has to be conﬁgured when commissioning the
device.
The laboratory demonstration system included devices that are fully based on the
IEC 61850 standard, which is the main protocol used in this automation system, as
well as devices compatible with the protocol and devices that do not support the
protocol at all. This gave a chance to compare the amount of commissioning work
required for each IED type to be operational by comparing the amount of parameters
to be conﬁgured for each IED. Examination showed a clear impact on the amount of
commissioning work when there are devices that are not fully compatible with the
standard and at the worst case the work required was almost tripled when comparing
to the standard based device.
7. Conclusions 66
Some improvements for the demonstration system and the test plan emerged.
One aspect was that the automation in this thesis system is designed to be used in
distribution network in mid and low voltage levels and at primary and secondary
substations, but all the non-functional requirement testing of the system was con-
ducted only for low voltage network and SSAU. This does not impair the test results
gained, since the functionality and interfaces of the PSAU and SSAU are practically
identical. With larger system more test cases could have been covered, such as co-
operation and integration of the two SAUs which could be beneﬁcial when deﬁning
the performance and probable constraints for the system. Methods to analyse the
scalability of the system were also presented, but more work should be done on that
since it is a crucial feature for a distributed system.
Some issues were raised and room for future development was found, but in
general the goals for the thesis were achieved and results presented. The aim was
to deﬁne critical NFRs for a decentralized automation system and present methods
to tests these requirements. The laboratory set up was introduced and deﬁned test
methods demonstrated with it successfully.
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